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I INTRODUCTION 
One of the curiosities of our legal system is that some of its oldest laws are 
still the most important. Parliamentary privilege is a case in point. Developed 
to meet the needs of medieval England, it has been modified, codified, fought 
over and tailored to different conditions, times and places, yet the essence of 
this ancient idea has become and remained a living part of New Zealand law. In 
spite of its antique heritage the nature and boundaries of Parliament's privileges 
are still the subject of dispute. 
As recently as 2002 the New Zealand Court of Appeal was called upon to 
decide a question of privilege. A parliamentarian's claim that he 'did not resile' 
from certain parliamentary statements formed the basis of an action in 
defamation. In Buchanan v Jennings 1 the Court held that privilege was not 
breached by allowing admission of a statement made in Parliament to supply a 
defamatory meaning to statements made outside of Parliament, where the 
unprotected statements amounted to an 'effective repetition' of the protected 
statements. The case turned on the scope of article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. 
The decision of the majority, with Tipping J dissenting, was based on 
claims that: 
1) The critical facts of this case distinguished it from other cases and 
meant that 'wider principles' had no application. 
2) There is a line of 'effective repetition' authorities from Australia and 
New Zealand that have caused no parliamentary concern over the last decade. 
The decision was a surprise because it seemed to depart from the previous 
law in this area. The courts have been faced with conflicting interests in this 
respect, since while it is clear that protection of the privileges is important, it is 
also clear that the privilege enshrined by the Bill of Rights is open to abuse. I 
will argue that narrowing the scope of parliamentary privilege in the manner 
captured by the Buchanan judgment will lead to greater uncertainty without 
' Buchanan v Jennings [2002) 3 NZLR 145 (CA) Richardson P, Gault, Keith and Blanchard J, 
Tipping J (dissenting). 
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limiting the scope for abuse of privilege. Rather than opening the way for 
greater judicial control of the privilege, it may be appropriate for Parliament to 
have more stringent internal procedures for responding to its abuses. 
II PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 
A What is Parliamentary Privilege? 
Parliamentary privilege is made up of the various rights and immunities of 
the House of Representatives.2 The privileges have their origin in England's 
constitutional history: some were asserted by Parliament and accepted by the 
Crown and courts as 'ancient practice', others were fully acknowledged only 
after constitutional struggle by the House of Commons during the seventeenth 
century.3 In New Zealand, section 242(1) of the Legislature Act 1908, provides 
that the New Zealand House of Representatives shall hold the same privileges 
as were held by England's House of Commons on January 1 1865. 
At the heart of parliamentary privilege lies freedom of speech. Members 
of Parliament are immune from any civil or criminal liability for proceedings in 
Parliament. Linked to this is the notion of the 'exclusive cognisance' of 
Parliament over its own proceedings. Parliament has sole right to determine 
what its procedures shall be, and sole right to punish breaches of those 
procedures.4 These privileges exist so that the House of Representatives can 
carry out its functions effectively. In order to freely debate the laws they create, 
and to provide an effective check on the workings of the executive, 
parliamentarians need to be able to speak freely and without fear of reprisal 
from any quarter. 5 
2 The New Zealand Law Commission The law of Parliamentary Privilege in New Zealand - A 
Reference Paper (NZLC MP 5, Wellington 1996) 6. 
3 The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege Volume I Report and Proceedings of the 
Committee (HL 43 - I, HC 214 - I The Stationery Office, London, 1999) 8-9. 
4 Report of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege Volume I Report and Proceedings 
of the Committee, above, I 0. 
5 Report of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege Volume I Report and Proceedings 
of the Committee, above, 8. 
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The privileges also exist to secure the separation of powers by ensuring 
Parliament's independence from the executive and the judiciary.6 The idea that 
Parliament should not be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts was originally 
based partly on a characterisation of Parliament as the highest 'court' in the land 
- subject to no lower authority. This must be understood in the context of 
medieval England, where the term 'court' held a range of meanings both 
political and judicial.7 In the twentieth century, Parliament can no longer be 
described as a 'court' in our modem, judicial sense.8 Rather, as lawmaker, its 
proceedings should not be subject to the jurisdiction of those who interpret 
those laws. 
B Parliamentary Privilege and the Courts 
The immunity of parliamentary proceedings from 'impeachment or 
questioning' in the courts, is regarded as "the only immunity of substance" 
possessed by Parliament.9 As such, it is a powerful exemption from the 
'ordinary law,' and in contexts such as defamation, it acts to prevent the 
availability of common law remedies. A recent case in the European Court of 
Human Rights examined the interplay between parliamentary privilege and the 
interest in reputation. In A v UK, a woman claimed that parliamentary privilege 
denied her right of access to a court for damage caused by attacks on her 
reputation made inside the British Parliament. Article 6 of the European 
Convention guarantees that "in the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing.. . by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law". The European Court of 
Human Rights concluded that parliamentary immunity pursued the legitimate 
aims of protecting free speech in Parliament and maintaining the separation of 
the judiciary and legislature: 10 
6 Harry Evans (ed) Odger 's Australian Senate Practice (10th ed, Department of the Senate, 
Canberra, 2001) 5. 
7 Jeffrey Goldsworthy The Sovereignty of Parliament - History and Philosophy (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2001) 38-9. 
8 Sir Clarrie Harders "Parliamentary Privilege - Parliament versus the Courts; Cross 
Examination of Select Committee Witnesses" ( 1993) 67 ALJ I 09, 123. 
9 Evans, above, 5 
10A v The United Kingdom (2002) European Court of Human Rights, Application 
No:00035373/97, para 21. 
While freedom of speech is important for everybody, it is especially so for an 
elected representative of the people. He or she represents the electorate, draws 
attention to their preoccupations and defends their interests. In a democracy, 
Parliament or such comparable bodies are the essential fora for political debate. 
Very weighty reasons must be advanced to justify interfering with the freedom of 
expression exercised therein. 
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The Court concluded that a rule of parliamentary immunity could not be 
regarded as a disproportionate limit on the right of access to a court under 
article 6 of the European Convention. While reputation is acknowledged as 
important, freedom of speech in Parliament is even more so. 
C Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 
Freedom of Speech in Parliament was given a statutory declaration in the 
Bill of Rights 1688. Article 9 of the Bill of Rights reads: 
That the freedome of speech and debates or proceedings in parlyament ought not 
to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parlyament. 
Despite the apparently plain words of article 9, there is uncertainty as to its 
scope. There is a conflict between the traditional claim of Parliament to be the 
exclusive judge of the extent of its own privileges, and the courts' view that it is 
for them to make that judgement, especially where the rights of third parties are 
involved. 11 As a result, the courts have some measure of control over the 
privileges of Parliament, but will be wary of how far to extend that control. 
1 Wider principles 
One of the central controversies surrounding freedom of speech in 
Parliament has concerned whether or not its scope is to be determined solely by 
article 9. At the time of its enactment, article 9 of the Bill of Rights was a 
11 Ha/sbury 's laws of England (4 ed Butterworths, London, 1980) vol 34, Parliament, para 
1003, 553. 
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statement of existing (though sometimes breached) privileges and not a creation 
of new law. 12 The Bill of Rights secured that privilege and as recently as 1985 
it was written that after the enactment of the Bill of Rights, "the extent of the 
privilege was to be found by reference to the statute and nothing else". 13 Three 
recent cases from the House of Lords and the Privy Council demonstrate the 
uncertainty surrounding article 9, and the development of judicial thinking 
concerning it. 
In 1993, Pepper v Hart14 was concerned with whether parliamentary 
materials such as Hansard might be consulted as an aid to interpretation of 
statutes. The House of Lords concluded that the practice would not constitute 
' impeaching or questioning' within the terms of article 9. 15 The House of Lords 
also rejected the suggestion that the Court was bound by anything other than the 
words of article 9 when considering parliamentary privilege. Lord Browne-
Wilkinson said in his judgment: 16 
The Attorney-General. . . said that article 9 was an illustration of the right that the 
House of Commons had won by 1688 to exclusive cognisance of its own 
proceedings . .. In fact, neither the letter from the Clerk of the Commons nor the 
Attorney-General have identified or specified the nature of any privilege 
extending beyond that protected by the Bill of Rights. 
Confronted with different fact situations, the courts have subsequently 
understood article 9 to have declared but not codified a freedom wider than that 
captured by its precise words. Only a year after Pepper v Hart, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Prebble v TVNZ, 
said: 17 
In addition to art 9 itself, there is a Jong line of authority which supports a wider 
principle, of which art 9 is merely a manifestation, viz. , that the Courts @d -----_:_ _____ _;__..;,._ ______
Parliament are astute to recognise their respective constitutional roles. 
12 G F Locke "Parliamentary Privilege and the Courts: The Avoidance of Conflict" [ 1985] PL 
64, 73. 
13 Rt Hon Lord Denning "Annex on the Strauss Case" [ I 985] PL 80, 89. 
14 Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593, 639 (HL). 
15 Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593, 639 (HL) Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
16 Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593, 645-6, (HL) Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
17 Prebble v TVNZ [1994] 3 NZLR 1, 7 (HL) Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
6 
Prebble was a New Zealand case in which a parliamentarian wished to sue 
a broadcaster in defamation for comments made about his conduct during his 
time as Minister for State-Owned Enterprises, including allegations that his 
implementation of government policy and statements made in Parliament had 
been part of a conspiracy to further the interests of highly placed business 
leaders. Part of the defamatory comments concerned Mr Prebble's actions in 
Parliament. Both the New Zealand Court of Appeal and the Privy Council held 
that parliamentary privilege prevented the defendant from using evidence of 
parliamentary events to support the defences of truth or fair comment, since to 
do so would involve the courts in 'questioning' proceedings in Parliament. 18 
Prebble, which differed from the ' paradigm' parliamentary privilege case 
where a non-member sues a member for defamatory words said in Parliament, 
forced the courts to consider afresh the role and meaning of article 9. The 
conclusion appears to have been that the scope of parliamentary privilege is not 
limited by the words of article 9. 
This view was affirmed by the House of Lords in the 2001 case of 
Hamilton v Al-Fayed 19 Neil Hamilton, MP, wished to sue Mr Al-Fayed in 
response to the latter's claims that he had bribed Mr Hamilton to ask questions 
in Parliament. The same allegations had been the subject of an investigation by 
the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, (who 
delivered the leading judgrnents in both Pepper v Hart and Prebble) declared 
that it was "well established that article 9 does not of itself provide a 
comprehensive definition of parliamentary privilege. "20 
18 See Prebble v Television New Zealand [ I 993) 3 NZLR 5 I 3, 520, (CA) Cooke P; Prebble v 
Television New Zealand [1994) 3 NZLR I, 11 (PC) Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
19 Hamilton v AI-Fayed [2001) I AC 395, (HL). 
20 Hamilton v AI-Fayed [2001) I AC 395, 402, (HL) Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
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2 The operation of article 9 
The controversy relates not just to the scope of article 9, but also to what 
have been described as its "conceptual ambiguities" .21 Article 9 does not 
operate simply as a blunt tool for blocking liability for things said in parliament. 
Rather, in combination with the wider principle, article 9 can be seen in the 
more recent cases to operate as a rule about what evidence may be admitted and 
the purposes for which it may be used. 22 
The Privy Council in Prebble held that while Hansard could be used to 
show what was said and done in Parliament as a "matter of history",23 the 
defendants could not use such evidence to show that "the actions or words were 
inspired by improper motives or were untrue or misleading."24 The Privy 
Council held that the exclusion of material from the Court on the grounds of 
parliamentary privilege was not so fatal to the defendant's case as to require a 
stay of proceedings, although such a stay might be appropriate in other cases.25 
Rather than dictating the outcome of the proceedings, article 9 simply affected 
what could and could not form part of the defendant's case. 
The same analysis of the role of article 9 can be seen in Hamilton. The 
English Court of Appeal held that the Court would only decline to hear 
proceedings if to do so risked an "assertion by the Court of any power to 
challenge the exercise of authority by Parliament."26 The House of Lords 
rejected this wholesale approach. The question of breach of article 9 was not to 
be dealt with by asking whether the hearing the proceedings risked a decision 
that would undermine Parliament's authority. Lord Browne-Wilkinson said: 27 
[Where] a party to litigation wishes to challenge the accuracy or veracity of 
something said in parliamentary proceedings .. . . The other party applies to prevent 
2 1 Nicholas Bamforth "Parliamentary Privilege and Defamation" (1999) 58 CLJ 471 , 471. 
22 A W Bradley "Mr Al-Fayed, Mr Hamilton and the Law of Parliamentary Privilege" [2000] 
PL 556, 557; Geoffrey Marshall "Impugning Parliamentary Impunity" [ 1994] PL 509, 509. 
23 Prebble v Television New Zealand [ 1994] 3 NZLR I, 11 (PC) Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
24 Prebble v Television New Zealand [ I 994] 3 NZLR 1, 10 (PC) Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
25 Prebble v Television New Zealand [1994] 3 NZLR I, 12 (PC) Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
26 Hamilton v Al-Fayed [ 1999] 3 All ER 317, 335 (CA) Lord Woolf MR. 
27 Hamilton v Al-Fayed [2001] I AC 395, 403-4 (HL) Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
the giving of that specific evidence or the challenging of a particular witness. If 
parliamentary privilege is held to exclude such evidence normally the only result 
(serious though it may be) is that the case is decided in the absence of that 
evidence. 
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Hamilton was eventually decided on the basis of a United Kingdom statute 
allowing individual members to waive their privilege. Nevertheless, the 
reasoning in the judgements gives an understanding of the current role of article 
9 and parliamentary privilege. Following Hamilton, it seems clear that, in 
England at least, the extent of the privilege is not limited to what is secured by 
article 9. Article 9 must be understood in the context of this idea of 'comity', 
or 'mutual restraint' between Parliament and the courts. This means that the 
prohibition against 'questioning' proceedings in Parliament will not operate 
simply to prevent the courts from hearing proceedings seeking liability for 
things said in Parliament, but will operate in a more complex way as a rule 
about what evidence the courts may receive. 
D Parliamentary Privilege in the New Zealand Context - Concerns 
About Abuse 
Despite its constitutional importance, parliamentary privilege is clearly 
open to abuse. Allowing parliamentarians to 'hide' behind privilege while 
making unwarranted attacks on the reputations of others may lead to substantial 
injustice. This is particularly the case when non-members are involved, since 
they have comparatively limited opportunities to defend themselves against 
public accusations. Over the last decade, there has been increasing concern 
about the use of parliamentary privilege in New Zealand as a "political 
weapon".28 The calls for reform were especially acute in the early nineties, 
when, between 1992 and 1994, members of Parliament made a series of 
separate allegations involving serious offences by business people, public 
officials and solicitors.29 
28 Sir Geoffrey Palmer "Parliament and Privilege: Whose Justice?" [I 994) NZLJ 325, 325 
29 Palmer, above, 325. 
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Allegations such as these formed the basis of Hyams v Peterson30 in 1991. 
In this case, the plaintiff relied on news reports of a memorandum tabled in 
Parliament to show that people would have understood other statements in the 
media to refer to him. The document in question, which was written by a 
Department of Justice official and named the plaintiff as part of a "Gang of 20" 
was allegedly published to "various reporters, MP's and others"31 before it was 
tabled in Parliament. The memorandum, and later news reports, suggested that 
the Gang of 20, a group of businesspeople and solicitors, was involved in 
fraudulent activity. The case was concerned with whether the document could 
be used to supply identity, rather than a defamatory meaning. Cooke P held that 
parliamentary privilege was not relevant since the plaintiff sought to rely on 
reports of parliamentary proceedings, rather than the proceedings themselves.32 
Therefore, the document could be used to show that the plaintiff was identified 
in the relevant news reports. 
In allowing the document to be used as evidence, the Court of Appeal 
observed, "There is no reason of common sense or policy why some artificial 
legal barrier should be placed in the way of the plaintiff in proving what the 
public would have understood from what was published to the public. "33 This 
comment must be understood in the context of a case focussed on the media, 
who formed the majority of the defendants. Accordingly the Court said "If 
there is to be a change in the law, drawing a line in favour of the media, it 
should be made by way of extending the defences of qualified privilege or fair 
comment. "34 
In Peters v Cushing,35 the High Court was required to consider the 
relationship between statements made inside the House, and allegations made in 
media interviews. In 1992, Mr Peters, MP, made allegations on the Holmes 
show about a businessman whom he subsequently identified in Parliament as 
30 Hyams v Peterson [1991] 3 NZLR 648 (CA). 
31 Hyams v Peterson, above, 653 Cooke P. 
32 Hyams v Peterson, above, 656 Cooke P. 
33 Hyams v Peterson, above, 656-7 Cooke P. 
34 Hyams v Peterson, above, 657 Cooke P. 
35 Peters v Cushing [ 1999] NZAR 241 (HC). 
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Mr Cushing. In an interview on Frontline some months later he repeated Mr 
Cushing's name and said that viewers could believe either him or Mr Cushing. 
Mr Cushing claimed two causes of action in defamation, the first based on the 
Holmes allegations and the parliamentary identification, and the second based 
on the Holmes allegations and the Frontline interview. 
The High Court in Peters held that a parliamentary statement could not be 
used to found an action in defamation. The full Court was unanimous that the 
first cause of action must fail since the parliamentary identification was 
protected by privilege.36 The second cause of action was complete without 
reference to the parliamentary words, since the public would be able to draw a 
connection between the allegations made in the Holmes interview, and the 
identification in the later Frontline interview.37 
While the case was decided on the basis of the connection between the two 
media interviews, Ellis J indicated that, "the plaintiff would have succeeded in a 
claim that the words of 10 October [the Frontline interview] adopted and 
republished what was said in Parliament."38 However, the plaintiff had 
"expressly refrained" from relying on the parliamentary words in respect of the 
second cause of action. 39 Grieg J limited his decision to the connection between 
the two unprotected interviews, making no comments on the issue of 'adoption' 
of protected statements. 
By 1999, the law of parliamentary privilege in New Zealand was difficult 
to state clearly. Hyams suggests that article 9 applies only to proceedings in 
parliament, not to reports of proceedings by media defendants.40 However 
James Allan has pointed out that Cooke P said the case had "nothing to do with 
the scope of parliamentary privilege".41 Arguably, the Hyams position can no 
longer be maintained in light of the Prebble decision that reports of 
parliamentary proceedings may be used to show that a given event occurred as a 
36 Peters v Cushing [1999) NZAR 241 , 245 (HC) Ellis J and 255, Grieg J. 
37 Peters v Cushing [ 1999) NZAR 241 , 251 (HC) Ellis J and 257, Grieg J. 
38 Peters v Cushing, above, 251 Ellis J. 
39 Peters v Cushing, above, 251 Ellis J. 
40 Peters v Cushing, above, 246 Ellis J. 
41 Allan James 'Parliamentary Privilege in New Zealand' (1996) 7 Canta LR 324,325 
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'matter of history' but may not be the subject of certain submissions or 
inferences. 
In addition, where parliamentary words are protected, that protection will 
not apply to a full repetition of those words outside of Parliament.42 Finally, 
there has been one suggestion that an 'adoption' of parliamentary words may 
not be protected. Ellis J used the terms 'adoption,' 'repetition' and 
'republished' interchangeably in Peters, but also grounded his obiter dicta in 
the distinction between an acknowledgement that defamatory words were said 
and a claim that the defamatory words were true.43 It is not clear whether his 
understanding of 'adoption' involves a full repetition or something less. 
Following Peters, parliamentary privilege in New Zealand was in a confused 
state. 
What is clear is that article 9 must be interpreted in a way that allows it to 
operate effectively in a modem context. Gone are the days when it was not 
permitted to repeat or publish the proceedings of the House.44 The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal has noted, "The reality for well over a century has 
been that the public has had available to it protected accounts of parliamentary 
proceedings. "45 The challenge for the courts and for Parliament now is to 
develop an understanding of parliamentary privilege that protects reputations 
from attacks made both inside and outside of Parliament, while preserving the 
relationship between Parliament and the courts and without inhibiting the 
freedom of speech so important to a functional legislature. 
42 R v Creevey (1813) I Esp 226; 105 ER 102 and R v lord Abingdon (1794) IM & S 273 ; 170 
ER 337. 
43 Peters v Cushing, above, 248 Ellis J. 
44 Joseph Maingot QC, Parliamentary Privilege in Canada (Butterworth & Co (Cananda) Ltd, 
Toronto 1982) 37. 
45 Buchanan v Jennings [2002) 3 NZLR 145, 166 para 57 (CA). 
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III BUCHANAN v JENNINGS 
In December 1997, Mr Jennings, MP, made accusations in Parliament 
about Mr Buchanan that would have been defamatory if not protected by 
parliamentary privilege. He accused Mr Buchanan, a senior official of the New 
Zealand Wool Board, of spending public money to promote a tour to the United 
Kingdom for the 'Barbarians' rugby team in order to "have a romp in London',46 
and "continue an indulgence in an illicit relationship".47 In an interview with 
The Independent some months later, Mr Jennings stated that he did not ' resile ' 
from those accusations about the relationship - "just the money".48 Mr 
Buchanan claimed that that statement defamed him because it "referred to, 
adopted, repeated and confirmed as true" the original, protected, accusations.49 
Mr Buchanan maintained that he was relying on the statement made in 
Parliament only as a matter of history, and not as forming the basis for Mr 
Jennings's liability. 
After unsuccessful strike out applications by Mr Jennings, Mr Buchanan 
succeeded in his claim for $50 OOO in damages. On appeal, the Court was asked 
to consider whether parliamentary privilege prevented liability for a statement 
made outside Parliament that affirmed, but did not literally repeat, a statement 
made inside Parliament. The majority concluded that it did not. The statement 
made in the interview was more than an acknowledgement of the protected 
speech - it was an "effective repetition" of it, and was therefore not protected by 
absolute privilege. The Court reasoned that the public would understand the 
unprotected statement as referring to the widely published accusations made in 
Parliament. Therefore evidence of the statement could be brought to establish 
what was said as a matter of historical fact. Since the unprotected statement 
was made after the protected statement, liability for it would not infringe or 
inhibit freedom of speech in Parliament, so there would be no breach of article 
9. 
46 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 149, para 2 Keith J for the majority. 
47 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 148, para 2 Keith J for the majority. 
48 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 149, para 5 Keith J for the majority. 
49 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 149, para 5 Keith J for the majority. 
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Tipping J dissented. He argued that since the later statements were not 
defamatory without reference to the earlier ones, Mr Buchanan's claim had to 
be understood as 'questioning' the words said in Parliament. In Tipping J's 
view, a repetition of protected statements would actionable only if the 
unprotected words were defamatory "in themselves".50 To accept the 
alternative would be to accept a limited view of the role of article 9. Even if 
liability in this case could not logically inhibit freedom of speech, to allow the 
Court to consider whether Mr Jennings had misled Parliament by his statements 
would be to encroach on Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction to an undesirable 
extent. 51 Tipping J proposed an alternative test that would require any 
unprotected words to be defamatory on their own before they could form the 
basis for liability. 
IV THE MAJORITY DECISION 
The majority identified two facts about the case before them that 
distinguished it from other cases concerning parliamentary privilege. The 
correct approach, according to the majority, was not to consider the case in light 
of those authorities, but rather to consider the 'critical facts' in light of the 
words and purpose of article 9. 
The critical facts identified by the majority were: 
1) The alleged defamatory statement was made up in part of a statement 
"in respect of which no claim of parliamentary privilege could be or is made."52 
2) The unprivileged statement was made after the privileged statements. 
A Critical Facts 
Mr Buchanan's claim rested partly on Mr Jennings' unprotected statement 
in The Independent that he did not resile from the parliamentary accusations, 
and partly on the parliamentary accusations themselves. As Tipping J remarked 
50 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 186, para 130 Tipping J dissenting. 
51 Buchanan v Jennings, above, I 88-9, paras 138 - 145 Tipping J dissenting. 
52 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 163, para 51 Keith J for the majority. 
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in his dissent, "It is ... difficult to disentangle the words spoken in and out of 
the House."53 The majority noted that this combination of privileged and 
unprivileged statements was a feature not found in the previous cases, especially 
Prebble, which the majority held was binding only on its facts. 54 
The second 'critical' fact is more equivocal. The majority used the timing 
of the statements to distinguish this case from the earlier case of Peters v 
Cushing. In Peters the protected statement was made after the unprotected 
statement, in Buchanan it was made before the unprotected statement. The 
decision in Peters was not based explicitly on the timing of the statements, but 
on the fact that the plaintiff could not complete his first cause of action without 
reference to the protected statements, whereas he could do so for the second 
cause of action. In order to determine whether the apparently minor fact 
difference of timing provides a sound basis for distinguishing one case from 
another, it is necessary to examine how it might make a difference to the 
operation of parliamentary privilege, in light of "the particular words of article 
9, its purpose and related principle."55 
B The Critical Facts and Article 9 
1 Inhibiting.freedom of speech 
Rather than focussing on the words of article 9, the majority based its 
decision on what it saw as the 'basic concept' of article 9 identified by Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson Prebble - preventing people in Parliament from being 
inhibited from speaking freely . This was why the order of events was so 
crucial. While allowing a later statement to complete an earlier statement 
clearly inhibits freedom of speech, the majority claimed that because the 
unprivileged statement was made after the privileged statement, "the prospect of 
the present proceedings would not have inhibited the appellant at the time he 
53 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 191 , para 154 Keith J for the majority. 
54 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 163, para 50 Keith J for the majority. 
55 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 163, para 50 Keith J for the majority. 
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spoke in the house."56 Thus, freedom of speech would not be inhibited. While 
this argument has a certain logic, the majority considered only what the 
consequences of their decision would have been on the facts before it, had the 
decision been anticipated. What it failed to consider was the consequence this 
decision will have on future speakers in Parliament. 
Tipping J noted that the decision of the majority effectively establishes a 
case-by-case approach to parliamentary privilege, based on a distinction 
between acknowledgement (not actionable) and affirmation (actionable). Of 
this distinction he said: 57 
The line ... is liable to be so fine that to make everything tum on the distinction 
between the two would be unsatisfactory and productive of uncertainty. An 
acknowledgement may implicitly amount to an affirmation, depending on subtle 
issues of context and inflection. 
The decision gives rise to a number of possible outcomes. One is that 
members will confine themselves to making statements inside the House. They 
will refuse to make any comments to the media about what was said inside the 
House. However, it is naive to require memberss not to be able to refer in 
interviews to things said inside the House. Given the openness of parliamentary 
proceedings (recognised in the majority's decision), politicianss are expected to 
talk to the media about what goes on inside the House. It is not politically 
viable for them not to. Rather, to make no comment may suggest that they did 
not make the comments in good faith - that they are hiding behind 
parliamentary privilege and do not stand by their comments. This will discredit 
them politically. 
Given this, a (more likely) alternative is that members will be circumspect 
in what they say in the House. They will limit themselves to the uncontroversial 
and non-defamatory, ensuring that they may safely refer to any aspect of their 
parliamentary performance without fear of reprisal. This could have some 
56 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 164, para 53 Keith J for the majority. 
57 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 193, para I 62, Tipping J dissenting. 
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positive outcomes for people such as Mr Buchanan. Their reputations will not 
suffer. But, on this account, freedom of speech in Parliament will suffer, and 
the purpose of article 9 will be frustrated. 
This was recognised by Lord Browne-Wilkinson m Prebble. When 
discussing the purpose of article 9, he noted: 58 
If there were any exceptions which permitted his statements to be questioned 
subsequently, at the time when he speaks in Parliament he would not know 
whether or not there would subsequently be a challenge to what he is saying. 
Therefore, he would not have the confidence the privilege is designed to protect. 
The Buchanan decision establishes precisely the sort of exception warned 
against by Lord Browne-Wilkinson. The order in which statements are made 
makes it no more easy or difficult for a member to know when his or her words 
outside Parliament will constitute an affirmation rather than an 
acknowledgement. 
Of course, in the High Court, Heron J had noted that Mr Jennings had gone 
"looking for" media attention, saying that this was not a case "where the 
remarks in Parliament may be unintentionally repeated in a media scrum outside 
Parliament or inadvisably referred to in an oblique way without any intention to 
give up the privilege".59 However, the line between acknowledgement and 
affirmation cannot be drawn on the basis on the defendant's aim in speaking. 
Allowing a doctrine of 'effective repetition' to develop on the basis of case-by-
case assessment establishes uncertainty as to whether, in the next case, someone 
might be held liable for comments made in just such 'media scrum' situations. 
2 Reading Article 9 
Aside from whether the claim about freedom of speech is justified, the 
approach taken by the majority appears to be an unduly narrow approach to 
58 Prebble v TVNZ [1994] 3 NZLR 1, 8 (PC) Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
59 Buchanan vJennings [2001) 3 NZLR 71 , 85 (HC) Heron J. 
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article 9 which gives the courts a far more powerful role by allowing them to 
judge members' speeches. According to Tipping J, the principle of mutual 
restraint is as much part of the ' basic concept' of article 9 as preventing 
inhibition: 60 
I regard the purpose and policy of art 9, in combination with the wider principle, 
as being additionally to avoid the courts becoming involved in any inquiry 
concerning, inter alia, the truth of what MP's say in the House, and their motives 
for speaking. 
Tipping' s approach is supported by an examination of the words of article 
9. The first limb is concerned with preventing inhibition of freedom of speech 
m Parliament, while the second limb states that debates or proceedings in 
Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any other court or 
place.61 That is, article 9 does not simply state that freedom of speech should 
not be inhibited - it states how this is to be done: proceedings in Parliament are 
not to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts. 
The majority adopts the following analysis of the case; Mr Jennings made 
a privileged statement, then an unprivileged statement. The public reading the 
unprivileged statement would have understood it to refer to the privileged 
statement (which had been made public under qualified privilege). The 
majority declared that "the defamation proceeding does not question ' freedom 
of speech' 'in Parliament' itself." Rather, it is Mr Jennings's "unprivileged 
statement, properly understood, that is being questioned."62 
Without reference to the parliamentary words, Mr Jennings' s statement in 
the Independent cannot bear a defamatory meaning63 (indeed, it can bear little 
meaning at all.) Counsel for Mr Buchanan submitted that the privileged words 
60 Buchanan v Jennings [2002] 3 NZLR 145, 187 - 8, para 138 (CA) Tipping J dissenting. 
61 The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege "Memorandum by Francis Bennion" Volume 
3 - Written Evidence (HL 43 - 1, HC 214 - I The Stationery Office, London, 1999) P 12-3 . 
62 Buchanan v Jennings , above, 164 para 52 Keith J for the majority. 
63 James Allan "Parliamentary Privilege: Will the Empire Strike Back?" (2002) 20 NZULR 205, 
207. 
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were being relied on only as "a matter of history".64 If this were so, they should 
be proved as neutral facts, with no objections raised to their having been said. 
However, the privileged words in this case were more than neutral. They were 
vital to whether the unprivileged statement could be 'properly understood.' 
Tipping J noted, " It is in substance their truth or falsity that is at the heart of the 
case. "65 By bringing a defamation case based on the unprivileged words, Mr 
Buchanan was clearly 'questioning' the unprivileged words in the sense of 
objecting to their having been said, and calling into question the truth of what 
was said 66 (since a defamatory statement must be untrue.)67 The statement "I 
do not resile from my claim" does not easily admit of truth or falsity, and cannot 
be defamatory on its own. If the meaning of the statement complained of relies 
entirely on an earlier, privileged, statement, (as is the case here) then Mr 
Buchanan must also be 'questioning' that earlier statement. He must be 
objecting to its having been said, and claiming that it is false. 
The majority claimed that according to their analysis of the case it is not 
one where "the exercise of freedom of speech in the House itself [is] being 
questioned".68 This is true, since no one was objecting to the existence of 
freedom of speech in Parliament. Despite this, closer examination of the words 
of article 9 shows that the second limb of article 9 was breached - debates or 
proceedings in Parliament were being questioned. 
3 Wider principles 
The majority in Buchanan stated that wider principles are not "helpful".69 
The courts can, must and often do, determine the limits of parliamentary 
privilege. 70 Since Prebble, the leading case in this area, affirms the wider 
principle of mutual restraint between the courts and Parliament, 71 any ground 
64 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 186, para 131 Tipping J dissenting. 
65 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 186, para 133 Tipping J dissenting. 
66 See James Allan ' Parliamentary Privilege in New Zealand' (1996) 7 Canta LR 324, 325-6 for 
a discussion of the meaning of the word 'questioned ' in Article 9. 
67 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 185, para 128 Tipping J dissenting. 
68 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 165, para 57 Keith J for the majority. 
69 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 164, para 54 Keith J for the majority. 
70 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 164-5, para 54 Keith J for the majority. 
7 1 Prebb/e v TVNZ [I 994) 3 NZLR I, 7-8 (PC) Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
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for saying that the principle does not apply should bear some relationship with 
the ground used to distinguish one case from the other - here, the critical fact 
that the alleged defamatory statement was made up of privileged and 
unprivileged statements. 72 I have argued that where an objection to the 
parliamentary statement is the substance of the complaint, there is necessarily 
an inquiry into the propriety of that parliamentary conduct. The fact that the 
court might also inquire into non-parliamentary conduct makes no difference to 
the application of the wider principle that the court should not enquire into 
parliamentary proceedings. 
This is made if clearer analysed in terms of the 'evidential' approach used 
in Prebble and Hamilton. In Prebble, the defendant' s case was able to proceed 
fairly without the evidence relating to parliamentary proceedings. In contrast, 
Mr Buchanan's claim could have no substance at all without reference to the 
parliamentary proceedings. Rather than suggesting that wider principles are 
unhelpful, this suggests that where the words complained of are made up of 
both privileged and unprivileged statements the wider principle should apply 
more than ever. 
V THE 'EFFECTIVE REPETITION' AUTHORITIES 
In light of the allegedly critical facts, the majority claimed a line of 
overseas authority allowing an earlier parliamentary statement to 'complete' a 
later statement. These case were known under the headings of 'effective 
repetition', ' adoption' or reaffirmation' .73 A closer examination of them shows 
that the position was not as clear-cut as the Court perhaps claimed. 
The first case relied on is Beitzel v Crabb. 74 Here, an Australian Member 
of Parliament described the plaintiff as a "blood-sucking parasite" while on the 
floor of the House. At an interview he said he stood by what he said, and at a 
later press conference where his words were repeated to him, he said he did not 
72 See Part IV A Critical Facts 
73 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 164, para 55 Keith J for the majority. 
74 Beitzel v Crabb (1996) 141 ALR 447 (SC (Vic)), Hampel J. 
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regret them, and made other comments about the plaintiff and what was said in 
Parliament including "if it turned out that ... everything I'd been told and 
everything I'd read had all been something I had imagined, yes, I would 
apologise, but that's not the case" and "I think he still hasn't got what he 
deserves". 75 Hampel J, on a strike out application, considered that there might 
be sufficient adoption, and that this was a question of mixed fact and law to be 
decided at trial. 
This case does appear to be an authority for a doctrine allowing a link to be 
afforded between protected and unprotected statements. Certainly the facts 
demonstrate the potential harm caused by malicious and irresponsible use of 
parliamentary privilege. While in this case the extent of the unprotected 
statements exceeded that of Buchanan, the comments still rely on parliamentary 
words for most of their meaning. While it is not clear that these facts would 
meet the alternative test presented by Tipping J, which requires unprotected 
words to be defamatory in their own right, Tipping J argued that Hampel J in 
Beitzel v Crabb failed to adequately consider the policy concerns surrounding 
article 9. 76 
The final case cited by the majority is the Australian case of Laurance v 
Kalter. 77 Laurance concerned a situation where a member made statements in 
Parliament about the plaintiff. In a later interview, the defendant said that he 
had evidence to support the parliamentary allegations. The case was based on 
the Australian Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987, rather than the actual words 
of article 9. This legislation was enacted following dissatisfaction with the 
decision in R v Murphy, which allowed the Court to review Select Committee 
evidence. 78 Section 16 of the Act deals with article 9 and freedom of speech, 
and declares the effect of article 9 in more detailed terms. 79 It was also 
75 Beitzel v Crabb (1996) 141 ALR 447, 450 (SC (Vic)), Hampel J. 
76 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 183, para 118 Tipping J dissenting. 
77 Laurance v Katter (l 996) 141 ALR 447 (SC (Qld)) Fitzgelrald P, Davies and Pincus JJA. 
78 Harry Evans (ed) Odger 's Australian Senate Practice (10th ed, Department of the Senate, 
Canberra, 2001) 6-7. 
79 Evans, above, 9. 
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mentioned in Prebble, where the Privy Council commented that section 16 
declared the original effect of article 9. 80 
In the Supreme Court of Queensland, Pincus JA held that Section 16(3) 
was invalid with respect to defamation cases.81 Davies JA read the section 
down to allow him to approach its application on a case-by-case basis allowing 
the Court to determine whether the admittance of the ' proceedings m 
Parliament' forbidden by the section would lead to its ' impeachment or 
questioning' before deciding whether the section applied in the circumstances of 
the case. 82 Davies JA then took the view that the section did not apply in that 
case because "the defendant was free to say what he did in Parliament".83 
The majority in Buchanan used Laurance as support for its case-by-case 
approach, noting "The Courts in such cases are saying that there is no difference 
in principle ... between the complete repetition of the parliamentary statement 
and its effective repetition."84 The majority also noted that Pincus and Davies 
JJ A highlighted some of the difficulties involved with equating section 16 with 
article 9.85 However, the decision in Laurance was widely criticised. Odger 's 
Australian Senate Practise has written of Laurance v Katter, "settlement of this 
case in 1998 prevented a pending review by the High Court. It is to be hoped 
that this incoherent judgement will not be followed in any jurisdiction."86 
Davies JA's approach was also criticised in the later case of Rann v 
Olsen, 87 a case where a Member of the Opposition in the South Australian State 
Parliament was suing the Premier. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had 
accused him of lying to a Commonwealth Parliamentary Committee. The Court 
held that parliamentary privilege would prevent the defendant from presenting 
80 Prebble v TVNZ [1994) 3 NZLR I, 8, Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
8 1 Laurance v Kalter (1996) 141 ALR 447, 486, (SC (Qld) Pincus JA. 
82 Laurance v Katter, above, 489-90, Davies JA. 
83 Laurance v Katter, above, 490, Davies JA. 
84 Buchanan vJennings [2002) 3 NZLR 145, 168, para 61 (CA) Keith J for the majority. 
85 Buchanan v Jennings, above, 167, para 60 Keith J for the majority. 
86 Harry Evans (ed) Odger 's Australian Senate Practice (10th ed, Department of the Senate, 
Canberra, 200 I) 46. 
87 Rann v Olsen (2000) 172 ALR 395 (SC(SA)) Doyle CJ, Prior, Perry, Mullighan and Lander 
JJ. 
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the defence of truth, since this would entail claims that the statements made to 
the Committee were untrue. 88 
The majority in Buchanan noted that Davies JA's reading of section 16 
had been questioned in Rann, but claimed that those comments were of "no 
consequence in the present case".89 Part of the criticism in Rann surrounded 
whether section 16 should be read as expanding the scope of article 9 -
something undoubtedly of no consequence in New Zealand. However, part of 
the disapproval of Davies JA's reading concerned the soundness of the case-by-
case approach. Citing the wider principle identified in Prebble, Doyle JA 
claimed: 90 
I consider that proper attention is not paid to the principle of non-intervention if 
one takes the approach, for example, that the section will apply only when the 
court concludes that its application is not required to protect freedom of speech in 
Parliament for the benefit of a particular person. 
And:91 
I consider that there are powerful arguments against conditioning the operation of 
such a law upon a judicial assessment, case by case, of the impact of the 
application of the law upon freedom of speech. 
Given that the main reason provided by the majority for their decision is 
that because of the order of events, freedom of speech will not be inhibited in 
this case, the comments from Rann apply to Davies JA' s judgement, and to 
cases such as Buchanan, whether or not the court is concerned with the specifics 
of section 16 or the broad terms of article 9. As discussed above, the Court in 
Buchanan has done precisely what was criticised about the Laurance judgement 
in Rann v Olsen, that is, created a case-by-case exception based on the 
difference between affirmation and acknowledgement as "a matter of fact to be 
determined in the circumstances of the case".92 
88 Rann v Olsen, above, 465, Doyle CJ and Mullighan J (Perry and Lander JJ concurring). 
89 Buchanan v Jennings (2002] 3 NZLR 145, 167, para 60 Keith J for the majority. 
90 Rann v Olsen 2000 172 ALR 395, 419, (SC (SA)) Doyle CJ . 
91 Rann v Olsen 2000 172 ALR 395, 427, Supreme Court of South Australia, Doyle CJ. 
92 Buchanan v Jennings (2002] 3 NZLR 145, 168, para 62 Keith J for the majority. 
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An examination of the cases reveals that rather than a clear line of 
authority, what emerges is a case with an approach almost identical to the 
Buchanan majority's, which was criticised in a later judgement and described 
by Odger 's Australian Senate Practise as ' incoherent' and one final case which 
deals only briefly with the complex issues arising in this area. 
VI ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES 
Those rightly concerned about the preservation of reputation might well 
ask what the alternative is to the majority decision. Tipping J presented a test 
that requires the words outside Parliament to be defamatory in their own right.
93 
While such a test may entail the conclusion that certain previous cases, such as 
Hyams, were wrongly decided, it would provide certainty, and also reflect the 
facts of cases involving repetition. Where the non-privileged statements are 
defamatory on their own, it can accurately and easily be said that it was those 
words that damaged the plaintiff's reputation. In contrast, in 'effective 
repetition' cases it is the parliamentary words that cause the damage to 
reputation. The later words, at worst, enhance the damage, and at best, make no 
difference, so should be privileged. 
It might be said that on this approach a problem still remams. 
Parliamentary privilege continues to be open to abuse. MP' s such as Mr Crabb 
are still free to describe people as ' blood sucking parasites' with impunity. 
Again, we might note Heron J' s comments to the effect that Mr Jennings went 
looking for publicity.94 Had he not done so, the original allegations might have 
been ignored and Mr Buchanan's reputation remained safe. It has been said that 
"without freedom of speech ... . public and private wrongs, great and small, will 
remain unrighted".95 However, as the law stood before Buchanan it could be 
argued that it was wrongs to reputations that were being left unrighted. 
93 Buchanan v Jennings [2002] 3 NZLR 145, 186, para 130 Tipping J dissenting. 
94 Buchanan v Jennings [2001] 3 NZLR 71 , 85 (HC) Heron J. 
95 District Law Society Public Issues Committee 'Speaking Out' Members of Parliament and the 
Judicial Process' [ 1988] NZLJ 300-4. 
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Yet it should be noted that this problem is as much about abuse inside 
Parliament as outside it. Buchanan has increased uncertainty for MP's without 
limiting the scope for abuse of privilege inside the House. It is more in line 
with the policy behind article 9 to develop a stronger remedy within Parliament 
than for the courts to engage in inquiries into parliamentary conduct. A strong 
remedy within Parliament would protect reputations in all cases where they are 
subject to unwarranted attack inside Parliament, not just those where the debate 
spills into the televisions and newspapers. It would also prevent uncertainty 
while preserving the separation of powers that is so important to our 
constitution. Of course, the courts are not in a position to develop such a 
remedy - this must be a job for Parliament itself, since it has the exclusive right 
to regulate its own proceedings. It may be time for parliamentarians to use that 
right to prevent the abuse of another. 
A Waiver of Privilege 
1 Waiver of privilege to allow liability 
In a slightly different context, section 13 of the Defamation Act 1996 in 
the UK allows individual members to waive their privilege. The section allows 
a Member of Parliament to use this power only in order to enable them to sue 
rather than be sued:96 the Prebble situation, as opposed to the Buchanan 
position. However, Hamilton v Al-Fayed demonstrated the difficulties 
associated with the prov1s1on. In that case, since the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Standards had already prepared a report about the relevant 
allegations, the Court was faced with the problem of conflicting decisions on the 
same issue. This was unavoidable because of the terms of the Defamation Act, 
yet it undermined one of the purposes of the privilege.97 In the United 
Kingdom, the Report of the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege has 
noted that in any case section 13 undermines the whole basis of parliamentary 
96 The Defamation Act 1996 (UK) s 13(4) reads "Nothing in this section affects any enactment 
or rule of law so far as it protects a person (including a person who has waived the protection 
referred to above) from legal liability for words spoken or things done in the course of, or for 
the purposes of or incidental to, any proceedings in Parliament." 
97 Hamilton v A/-Fayed (2001] I AC 395, 407-8 (HL) Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
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privilege since it is the privilege of the whole House, rather than of individual 
members.98 The Committee proposed as an alternative that the whole House, 
rather than individual members, be permitted to waive the privilege, though 
only in cases where there is no question of legal liability arising for the 
parliamentary statements.99 In other words, as is the case under the current 
section 13, the House would be permitted to waive privilege only in Prebble 
situations, never in Buchanan ones. 
This might be compared with the power of the Singaporean Parliament to 
waive the privilege to allow continuous abusers to be liable in court. 100 An 
alternative option for a 'stronger remedy' is mentioned in the New Zealand Law 
Commission Reference Paper: allowing the Ombudsman to investigate 
complaints and waive absolute privilege for persistent abusers of its protection. 
However, the Law Commission has noted that during the calls for reform in the 
mid 1990's, the option appeared to be "either not considered, or rejected as 
potentially too uncertain or strict". 101 
2 Waiver of privilege and Special Commissions of Inquiry 
A similar approach to the Ombudsman proposal was adopted in New South 
Wales in 1997. A Member of the Legislative Council, Franca Arena, made 
allegations in Parliament that the Premier and a Royal Commissioner 
investigating the New South Wales Police Service had agreed to suppress the 
names of certain people "in high political, judicial and social positions in the 
community"102 who had been accused of involvement in paedophilia and 
criminal conduct. 103 The Parliament of New South Wales responded to these 
98 The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege Volume I Report and Proceedings of the 
Committee (HL 43 - 1, HC 214 - 1 The Stationery Office, London, 1999) 24, para 68. 
99 The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege Volume I Report and Proceedings of the 
Committee, above, 25-6, para 73. 
100 Parliament (Privileges, Immunities and Powers) Act Chapter 217 (Singapore) s 20(3) 
101 The New Zealand Law Commission The Law of Parliamentary Privilege in New Zealand - A 
Reference Paper (NZLC MP 5, Wellington 1996) 30. 
IO Parliament of New South Wales Legislative Council Standing Committee on Parliamentary 
Privilege and Ethics Report on Inquiry into the Conduct of the Honourable Franca Arena MLC 
(1998) Report No 6. Vol I of3, ix. 
103 Enid Campbell "Investigating the Truth of Statements made in Parliament" [ 1998] PL 
125,127. 
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allegations by passing the Special Commissions of Inquiry Amendment Act 
1997, which allowed a two-thirds majority in Parliament to authorise the 
establishment of a Special Commission of Inquiry into Mrs Arena's allegations. 
Since the body was extra-parliamentary, article 9 would otherwise apply to it, so 
the Act also allowed for parliamentary privilege to be waived. However, the 
waiver was effective only to allow Mrs Arena to give evidence of parliamentary 
proceedings if she wished to do so. The Commission could receive evidence of 
what was said in Parliament in order to establish the truth of the allegations but 
the waiver did not operate to allow liability to be imposed for things said or 
done in Parliament. 104 These new provisions had a built in expiry period of six 
months, so that the power could only be used to respond to Mrs Arena's 
allegations. 105 
The Commission proceeded to investigate, albeit without evidence from 
Mrs Arena, as allowed by the provisions of the Amendment Act. It found her 
allegations to be "false in all respects" and made with no evidential 
foundation. 106 In response to the Report, the Attorney General moved that Mrs 
Arena be expelled, and the issue was sent to the Privileges and Ethics 
Committee for consideration. 107 The Committee found that Mrs Arena's 
conduct "fell below the standard the House is entitled to expect of a Member, 
and brought the House into disrepute". 108 The Committee recommended that 
Mrs Arena be called upon to present a written apology and withdrawal of her 
statements, and that if she failed to do so within five working days, she be 
suspended from the service of the House until the apology and withdrawal were 
submitted. 109 
3 Discussion 
104 Enid Campbell, above, 128. 
105 Enid Campbell, above, 135. 
106 Enid Campbell, above, 133. 
107 Enid Campbell, above, 133. 
108 Parliament of New South Wales Legislative Council Standing Committee on Parliamentary 
Privilege and Ethics Report on Inquiry into the Conduct of the Honourable Franca Arena MLC 
(1998) Report No 6. Vol 1 of3, x. 
109 Parliament of New South Wales Legislative Council Standing Committee on Parliamentary 
Privilege and Ethics Report on Inquiry into the Conduct of the Honourable Franca Arena MLC, 
above, xi. 
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Limiting any power of waiver to Parliament, rather than an ombudsman or 
other outside agency, is to be preferred. The advantage of removing the 
capacity to judge allegations or decide whether to waive the privilege from the 
House is that it eliminates the risk associated with majorities in Parliament 
using such procedures to discipline Opposition members only or using the 
power as a means of preventing debate on unfavourable topics. 110 However, 
whether the waiver is an individual or a committee, control over the privilege 
has been taken out of Parliament's hands, where it rightly belongs. The New 
South Wales approach provides an example of a process whereby control over 
the privilege and sanctions for its abuse is retained by Parliament, but the actual 
investigation of the truth of allegations is removed into a neutral, quasi-judicial 
forum. In addition, because the establishment of a Special Commission 
required a two-thirds majority, there could be no question of a majority 
government acting to protect its own interests. 
The Joint Committee's recommendation in favour of limiting the power of 
waiver to cases where there is no question of liability has the disadvantage of 
remedying the harm caused by article 9 to members while leaving non-members 
open to all its detriments. The New South Wales Investigation is open to a 
similar criticism - those falsely accused of the cover up by Mrs Arena were still 
unable to pursue a claim in the courts. The Joint Committee has argued that this 
'basic imbalance' is caused by article 9, not by limiting any power of waiver. 111 
It believed that allowing the House to determine when to waive means that 
parliamentary matters may be considered in court when to do so will not 
undermine the interests of the House, for example, where there is no risk of 
conflicting decisions. Implicit in this argument is the suggestion that it will 
never be in the interests of the House to allow liability for parliamentary 
statements since to do so would necessarily inhibit freedom of speech. 112 
110 Harry Evans (ed) Odger 's Australian Senate Practice (10th ed, Department of the Senate, 
Canberra, 200 I) 72. 
111 The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege Volume I Report and Proceedings of the 
Committee (HL 43 - I, HC 214 - I The Stationery Office, London, 1999) 26, para 76. 
112 The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege Volume I Report and Proceedings of the 
Committee, above, 26, para 74. 
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While the New South Wales process did not allow liability, it did result in 
sanctions for Mrs Arena, including the demanded apology and threatened 
suspension. Mrs Arena challenged the constitutionality of the Amendment Act 
on the basis that it derogated from the requirement of freedom of speech in 
parliament. The High Court of Australia rejected this argument, noting that Mrs 
Arena would always remain free from legal consequences for her conduct, 113 
and that the Parliament had a legitimate interest in investigating the truth of the 
allegations. 114 The prospect of political consequences, however dramatic, 
cannot be regarded as a barrier to free speech. Furthermore, it is 
uncontroversial that Parliament has the right to regulate its own proceedings. 
This includes the right to discipline members for breaches of those proceedings. 
Article 9 is directed at inhibitions of free speech from outside Parliament, not 
within it. 
A general power of waiver would solve a number of article 9' s drawbacks, 
not simply those relating to defamation. However, it seems that abuse within 
the House by members is a more pressing drawback than member's being 
unable to sue. Even more critically, allowing Parliament to waive immunity to 
allow liability would create the same risks and uncertainty associated with case-
by-case exceptions as are raised by the decision in Buchanan. In contrast, the 
New South Wales approach allows the truth to be established without the 
prospect of liability. However, it is an example of an "extraordinary measure ... 
enacted to deal with extraordinary circumstances". 115 Such a response, if 
adopted in New Zealand, would only be suitable for the most serious 
allegations, where matters of public importance were at stake as well as private 
reputations. 
Finally, there is a risk that the act of waiver itself would create the 
impression that the member was in the wrong, even before the full case was 
heard. While the courts would not be so easily influenced, there is a real risk 
113 Enid Campbell 'Investigating the Truth of Statements made in Parliament' [1998) PL 
125,130. 
114 Arena v Nader (1997) 71 ALJR 1604, 1605 (HC (Aust)) Brennan CJ, Gummow and Hayne 
JJ. 
115 Enid Campbell, above, 135. 
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that the public might. Accordingly, a power of waiver to allow liability is not 
considered an appropriate remedy for New Zealand. A power of waiver to 
establish or assist an investigating committee may be appropriate only in the 
most extreme situations, but should be limited to an investigation of the truth of 
statements, not imposition of legal liability. 
B Right of Reply 
The main remedy currently available in New Zealand is the 'right of 
reply.' Under Standing Orders 161 - 164 an aggrieved person may apply to the 
Speaker to have their response to any allegations incorporated into the 
parliamentary record. This measure was adopted as an alternative to the 
Parliamentary Privileges Bill 1994. The Bill attempted to prevent abuse of 
privilege by including a requirement that MP's give notice to the Speaker, in 
advance, of any assertions likely to adversely affect a person's reputation and 
satisfy the Speaker that such assertions were well grounded. 116 Such a process 
was apparently rejected "in principle" 117 by the Select Committee since it would 
"transfer the moral and political responsibility for making an attack from the 
member who made it, to the Speaker who authorised it." 118 
The English Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege has identified 
some of the problems associated with a right of reply. It believed there is a lack 
of immediacy, which reduces the effectiveness of the replies in restoring any 
harm done. However, like the New Zealand Parliament, the Australian Senate 
provides the right to have a reply incorporated into the written record. This 
process can be speedy. For example, in 2001 a submission was received, 
reported on, and published all in the same day. 119 The Australian experience 
116 The New Zealand Law Commission The Law of Parliamentary Privilege in New Zealand - A 
Reference Paper (NZLC MP 5, Wellington 1996) 27 
117 The New Zealand Law Commission The Law of Parliamentary Privilege in New Zealand - A 
Reference Paper (NZLC MP 5, Wellington 1996) 30. 
118 Standing Orders Committee " Report on the Parliamentary Privilege Bill" [ 1994] AHJR I l 8C 
6. 
119 Harry Evans (ed) Odger 's Australian Senate Practice (10th ed, Department of the Senate, 
Canberra, 200 I) 71. 
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indicates that the fears of the Joint Committee in this respect may be somewhat 
overstated. 
The Joint Committee also voiced concerns about overuse of the right of 
reply. The system relies on the responses being publicised for it to be effective, 
since an unpublicised response will not repair a damaged reputation. However, 
that same publicity may lead to the overuse of the remedy. The Report of the 
Joint Committee mentioned concerns that a situation might arise where not 
responding to any allegations might be seen as ''tantamount to acceptance of 
truth of the allegations". 120 
In the thirteen years between November 1988 and June 2001, a total of 
thirty-four responses were incorporated into the reports of the Australian. 121 
This suggests that the procedure is seen as effective but not overused. 
Furthermore, any 'overuse' may not in fact present any real problem. If the 
process can be as speedy and efficient as the Australian experience suggests, 
then its popularity need not present any administrative problems. The responses 
will simply promote public debate and accountability, which is an outcome that 
cannot be seen as undesirable. 
The Joint Committee also raised the possibility that the replies may get less 
publicity than the original allegations, since they would not get the media 
coverage associated with the heated debates in which harmful allegations are 
likely to arise. 122 A right of reply might be made more powerful and effective if 
it granted the right to be heard in person. The effect would be more immediate 
- parliamentarians would be sure to hear the reply, and the chances of it 
receiving appropriate publicity would be significantly increased. However, it 
would be a more cumbersome process than the incorporation of a reply into the 
written record. The parliamentary agenda would be have to be altered (though 
replies could be kept short) and any delay would carry a risk of Parliament 
120 The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege Volume I Report and Proceedings of the 
Committee (HL 43 - I, HC 214 - I The Stationery Office, London, 1999) 59 
121 Harry Evans, above, 587-614 
122 The Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege Volume I Report and Proceedings of the 
Committee, above, 59. 
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becoming 'bogged down' with responses to allegations made some time 
previously. However, the increased magnitude of the response might prevent its 
overuse. The delay and greater publicity would mean that people would be 
reluctant to use it unless certain that it was necessary since the alternative would 
involve reviving the public memory of forgotten allegations. Of course, such a 
system would favour the confident and articulate. Perhaps, then, the 'response 
in person' could be one option in a range of alternatives, including the 
incorporation of a written response, or having the response read by the Speaker. 
A final problem is that the reply may not restore the hurt reputation. A 
right of reply leaves no scope for determining the truth of any allegations. 
Rather, it is simply a matter of claim and counter-claim. In addition, even 
where a reputation is effectively restored, a right of reply provides no financial 
recovery, and damage to reputation can have important financial implications. 
VII CONCLUSIONS 
Ultimately, the risk to reputation inherent in the protection accorded by 
article 9 is a justified and necessary price to pay for the advantages of freedom 
of speech in Parliament. For article 9 to achieve its aims effectively, its 
protection must apply with some measure of certainty. Parliamentary privilege 
is not one of those areas where the case-by-case approach based on factual 
assessments, as used in Buchanan, is the most appropriate. It is the job of 
Parliament, both as a collection of responsible individuals and also as a House 
capable of self-regulation, to recognise and act on the scope for abuse of its 
privileges. The Special Commission established in New South Wales provides 
a compelling model for response to extraordinary abuses, but it is, of course, to 
be hoped that such a drastic measure will not be required in New Zealand. If it 
proves necessary, it may be appropriate to provide a ' stronger' right of reply as 
a remedy for maligned reputations and possible method of prevention of abuse 
of privilege. 
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